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Abstract 
The theory of mental models postulates that disjunctions of the sort, A or B, where 
A and B are sensible everyday clauses, have a core meaning that allows an inclusive 
interpretation, referring to three possibilities: A and not-B, not-A and B, and A and B.  The 
meaning of the clauses and knowledge can modulate this meaning by blocking the 
construction of at least one model of a possibility, e.g., “Rui is playing tennis or he is 
surfing” blocks the model of Rui doing both activities.  This theory is implemented in a 
computer program. Three experiments investigated the core interpretation and 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
s A
na
 C
ris
tin
a Q
ue
lha
s] 
at 
03
:10
 19
 Fe
bru
ary
 20
16
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
2 
 
 
 
interpretations in which the contents of the clauses should block the model of A and B (as 
in the preceding example), the model of A and not-B, or the model of not-A and B.   In 
Experiment 1, the participants listed the possibilities for each of the four sorts of 
disjunction. The results corroborated the predicted modulations.   In Experiment 2, these 
predicted interpretations governed the conclusions that participants accepted from 
disjunctions and categorical premises.  In Experiment 3, the predicted interpretations 
yielded reliable effects on the conclusions that the participants drew for themselves.  We 
relate these results to theories of reasoning. 
 
Keywords: deductive reasoning, disjunctions, logic, mental models, modulation 
 
Word count: Abstract – 199 words; Text – 7984 words 
 
In logic, sentential connectives corresponding to if, or, and and, have constant 
meanings, which map the truth values of their clauses onto a truth value for the 
compound as a whole, e.g., an inclusive disjunction A or B or both is true if at least one 
of its clauses is true (Jeffrey, 1981). In daily life, the meanings of connectives vary from 
one assertion to another (Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993), and understanding does not 
concern truth values (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991).  Consider, for instance, the 
difference between these two disjunctions: 
Filomena is eating clams or Paulo is eating sardines. 
and: 
 Luís is eating gazpacho or he is eating vegetable broth. 
Typically, individuals are biased towards an inclusive interpretation of the first 
example, which includes the possibility that both of its clauses are true, but a sizeable 
minority prefers an exclusive interpretation (Newstead & Griggs, 1983).  In contrast, 
individuals tend to concur that the second example is an exclusive disjunction because it 
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excludes the possibility that Luis is eating both sorts of soup at the same time.  The 
theory of mental models – the “model theory” for short – postulates that understanding 
depends on constructing mental representations of the possibilities to which assertions 
refer. These representations are models that insofar as possible have a structure 
isomorphic to the structure of the situations to which the assertions refer. And the 
theory distinguishes between mental models, which represent only clauses that hold in 
each possibility, and fully explicit models, which also represent clauses that do not hold 
(see, e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 2006; Khemlani & Johnson-
Laird, 2013).  Because mental models do not represent clauses that do not hold in a 
possibility, they predict the occurrence of “illusory” inferences in certain cases, i.e., 
inferences from disjunctions that are systematically fallacious.  Such errors are robust 
(Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009).  Perhaps the simplest example is that most 
reasoners judged that pairs of assertions, such as the following two: 
 Either the pie is on the table or else the cake is on the table. 
Either the pie isn’t on the table or else the cake is on the table. 
could both be true at the same time (Johnson-Laird, Lotstein, & Byrne, 2012).  In fact, 
they cannot be: their fully explicit models have no possibility in common. 
In cognitive science, a standard view of disjunctions is that the inclusive 
meaning is basic and is taken for granted unless a sentence makes explicit that a 
disjunction is exclusive (Barrett & Stenner, 1971; Grice, 1989; Kamp & Reyle, 1993, p. 
191-2), and evidence shows that an exclusive interpretation can take more time – at 
least in the evaluation of truth or falsity (Chevallier, Noveck, Nazir, Bott, Lanzetti, 
& Sperber, 2008).  Theories of reasoning based on formal logic likewise take the 
inclusive sense as basic (e.g., Rips, 1994; Braine & O’Brien, 1998).   One problem for 
this standard view, however, is that inferences from exclusive disjunctions are easier 
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than those from inclusive disjunctions – a point that we illustrate below.  In contrast to 
the standard view, the model theory allows an initial representation of disjunctions that 
is compatible with both an inclusive and an exclusive interpretation (Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991, p. 45; Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992).  An inclusive 
interpretation of a disjunction, such as: Filomena is eating clams or Paulo is eating 
sardines, elicits three mental models of possibilities, as depicted in the following 
diagram: 
 Filomena eating clams 
     Paulo eating sardines 
 Filomena eating clams Paulo eating sardine 
We use descriptions for convenience in such diagrams; real mental models represent the 
world.  An exclusive interpretation of the disjunction omits the third model in which 
both events occur.   The fully explicit models of the inclusive interpretation are: 
  Filomena eating clams ¬  Paulo eating sardines 
 ¬  Filomena eating clams  Paulo eating sardines 
  Filomena eating clams  Paulo eating sardines 
where “¬” denotes the negation of a clause.  Intuitions rely on single mental models, 
whereas deliberative reasoning calls for fully explicit models (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 
1983, Ch. 6; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2013).  To think about several possibilities 
takes time, and so when individuals are short of time, they tend to revert to intuitions 
from mental models, and to be less likely to make inferences that depend on fully 
explicit models (Quelhas, Johnson-Laird, & Juhos, 2010). In simple tasks, such as 
listing the possibilities to which an assertion refers, individuals can list those that 
correspond to fully explicit models.   
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 The core meaning of a disjunction, A or B, where A and B are sensible clauses, 
allows for an inclusive interpretation, which elicits a set of mental models representing 
the following possibilities (Johnson-Laird, Lotstein, & Byrne, 2012): 
 A 
  B 
 A B 
But, in tasks such as the listing of possibilities, individuals should be able to flesh out 
these models into fully explicit models, which represent clauses that hold and clauses 
that do not hold in each possibility: 
  A ¬ B 
 ¬ A  B 
  A  B 
Inclusive disjunctions can be expressed explicitly, using “or both”: 
 A or B, or both. 
Likewise, an exclusive disjunction can be expressed explicitly, using “but not both”: 
 Either A or else B, but not both. 
It elicits just two mental models: 
  A   
    B 
and accordingly has two fully explicit models: 
  A ¬ B 
 ¬ A  B 
 The basic principle of reasoning is that individuals draw conclusions that their 
models of the premises support.  Hence, their interpretation of compound assertions, 
such as disjunctions, is critical for the conclusions that they infer.  Because disjunctions 
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can call for three models, reasoning from them is notoriously difficult (see, e.g., Evans 
et al., 1993).  One corroboration of the use of models is that an inference of this sort: 
 A or B. 
 Not A. 
 Therefore, B. 
is easier to infer from an exclusive disjunction, which calls for only two models, than 
from an inclusive disjunction, which calls for three models (Johnson-Laird, et al., 1992; 
Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993).  Another corroboration of the use of models is that 
disjunctive inferences based on negative categorical premises, such as the preceding 
example, are more difficult than those that depend on affirmative categorical premises 
(e.g., Roberge, 1976; Johnson-Laird et al., 1992).  One cause of the difficulty is that the 
negative is inconsistent with a model and calls for its elimination (Johnson-Laird, 1991, 
p. 55). This inconsistency causes even greater difficulty when an affirmative categorical 
premise contradicts a negative clause in the disjunction (Johnson-Laird & Tridgell, 
1972).  Likewise, the elimination of a mental model of a disjunction leaves no 
conclusion to be drawn, and so reasoners need to flesh out their models into fully 
explicit ones in order to make an inference.   
 The model theory postulates that each sentential connective has a core meaning, 
but that the contents of clauses and knowledge can modulate this meaning (Johnson-
Laird & Byrne, 2002).  The core meaning consists of a set of possibilities, and 
modulation can have two effects.  First, it can block the construction of models of 
possibilities.   Second, it can add relations between models of the two clauses, such as a 
temporal or spatial relation (Juhos, Quelhas, & Johnson-Laird, 2012), which can affect 
reasoning in similar ways to explicit assertions of relations (Goodwin & Johnson-Laird, 
2005). 
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 Previous studies have investigated the effects of content on disjunctive 
reasoning, but have concerned differences between abstract and concrete meanings, 
which can affect the difficulty of inferences (e.g., Van Duyne, 1974; Roberge, 1977).  
Previous studies have also corroborated both sorts of effects of modulation on 
conditional assertions of the sort, If A then B, which have the mental models: 
 A B 
    .  .  . 
where the ellipsis represents the possibilities in which A does not hold.   As Quelhas et 
al. (2010) showed, individuals tend to list the fully explicit models for unmodulated 
conditionals, such as: “If the dish is kidney beans then its basis is beans”: 
 Kidney beans  basis beans  (   A  B) 
 Not kidney beans basis not beans (¬ A   ¬ B) 
 Not kidney beans basis beans.  (¬ A      B) 
But, for a conditional such as, “If a plumber repairs the pipes then he must be paid,” 
individuals tended to list only two possibilities (A and B, not-A and not-B) equivalent to 
a biconditional interpretation of the conditional.  The inferences that reasoners made 
from conditionals likewise reflected the effects of modulation.  
 The second sort of modulation adds information to models.  A conditional, such 
as, If Carla printed the report, then the toner ran out, elicits the interpretation that the 
printing occurred before the toner ran out, whereas the conditional, If Jessica visited 
Lisbon, then Leonel invited her, yields the interpretation that Jessica’s visit occurred 
after Leonel’s invitation (Quelhas et al., 2010).  Modulation can also introduce spatial 
relations, and for some conditionals, such as: If the maid cleans the desk, then she puts 
the folders on the floor, it yields temporal and spatial relations.  In this case, it implies 
that the maid first moved the folders from the desk to the floor, and then cleaned the 
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desk (Juhos et al., 2012).  Modulation according to the model theory is semantic, 
depending on the meanings of clauses, or pragmatic, depending on knowledge in long 
term memory, or both.   
 We have written a computer program to demonstrate how modulation occurs, 
and we outline its main procedures here.  As an example, consider the assertion: 
 It’s raining or it’s pouring. 
Its interpretation as an inclusive disjunction would, in principle, yield the following 
fully explicit models of possibilities: 
   raining ¬ pouring 
 ¬ raining    pouring 
    raining    pouring 
Reasoners know, however, that it can’t pour without raini g, i.e., if it’s pouring then it’s 
raining. The program can build models of this proposition, but, because the theory 
postulates that knowledge is often represented in models, it contains fully explicit 
models of the proposition in its knowledge base: 
   pouring     raining 
 ¬ pouring ¬ raining 
 ¬ pouring    raining 
The program forms a conjunction of the set of models for the assertion and the set of 
models in knowledge.  In essence, the procedure constructs all pairwise combinations of 
the two sets except for those that are inconsistent with one another, e.g., one model 
represents raining and another model in a conjunction represents its negation: ¬ 
raining.  The conjunction in the present case blocks the model of an impossibility to 
which the assertion would otherwise refer:  
 ¬ raining    pouring 
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The program therefore yields an interpretation in which it’s raining and may, or may 
not, be pouring: 
    raining ¬ pouring 
    raining    pouring 
Given the further premise: 
 It’s not pouring 
it follows validly: 
 It’s raining. 
Logicians often suggest instead that this sort of inference is an enthymeme, that is, it 
merely calls for a missing premise in order to yield a proof of the conclusion.  We 
consider this alternative to modulation after we have reported our experimental results. 
 The aim of the present studies was to investigate whether modulation can block 
the construction of models of disjunctions.   The studies focus on four sorts of 
disjunction.  For a disjunction, such as: 
1. Ana is in Portugal or Rui is in Spain 
modulation should not block the construction of any models, and so the disjunction can 
receive an interpretation corresponding to an inclusive interpretation.  It refers to three 
possibilities, which mental models represent as follows: 
 Ana in Portugal 
       Rui in Spain 
 Ana in Portugal  Rui in Spain 
For a disjunction, such as: 
2. Ana is in Portugal or she is in Spain 
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modulation should rule out the possibility in which one person – Ana – is in two 
different countries at the same time.  Hence, it should receive an exclusive 
interpretation: 
 Ana in Portugal 
      Ana in Spain 
For the disjunction: 
3.  Ana is in Lisbon or she is in Portugal 
the first clause implies the second clause, because Lisbon is in Portugal, and so 
modulation should yield an interpretation with a forwards interpretation: 
 Ana in Lisbon  Ana in Portugal 
      Ana in Portugal 
For the disjunction: 
4. Ana is in Portugal or she is in Lisbon 
the second clause implies the first, and so modulation should yield a backwards 
interpretation: 
 Ana in Portugal 
 Ana in Portugal  Ana in Lisbon 
Hurford (1974) argued that disjunctions such as the forwards and backwards ones are 
unacceptable, because one clause entails the other.  Yet, despite his intuitions, such 
disjunctions do occur in daily life.  For example, the following backwards disjunction 
occurs on YouTube:  “We have a commitment to see you the same day or within 24 
hours.”   Such disjunctions may be odd because they violate the convention that 
discourse should be informative (cf. the maxim of quantity in Grice, 1989).  They can 
be ameliorated by context or by the addition of a phrase, such as “at least,” 
acknowledging their redundancy, e.g., “We have a commitment to see you the same day 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
s A
na
 C
ris
tin
a Q
ue
lha
s] 
at 
03
:10
 19
 Fe
bru
ary
 20
16
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
11 
 
 
 
or at least within 24 hours”.  Nevertheless, our experiments used disjunctions without 
such qualifying phrases. Table 1 below summarizes the predicted possibilities for each 
of the four sorts of disjunction. 
 In what follows, we report three experiments designed to test whether naive 
individuals – those who know nothing about logic – list the possibilities appropriate to 
these interpretations, evaluate inferences that follow from them, and draw their own 
appropriate conclusions from them. Finally, we discuss the implications of the results 
for current theories of reasoning.  
 
Experiment 1 
Our first experiment examined the four sorts of disjunction summarized in Table 
1 below in order to test whether modulation blocked the predicted models of 
possibilities.  The participants’ task was to list what is possible given disjunctions of the 
four sorts (inclusive, exclusive, forwards, and backwards). 
 
Method 
Participants 
The participants were 44 psychology undergraduates from ISPA, in Lisbon, who 
volunteered to take part in the experiment. They were 38 women and six men, average 
aged 20 years (SD = 5.304). 
Design 
The participants acted as their own controls, and listed possibilities for six different 
contents for each of the four sorts of disjunction (inclusive, exclusive, forwards, and 
backwards) in a total of 24 trials.    
Material and Procedure 
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We devised contents concerning six topics from everyday life, which could be used for 
each of the four sorts of disjunction.  These topics were locations, sporting activities, 
work, cultural activities, leisure, and cuisine. Supplemental Material A shows the 
contents translated into English, and Supplemental Material B shows them in 
Portuguese, which was the native language of the participants and the language in 
which the experiment was carried out.  Each disjunction referred to one or two people 
using proper nouns, with an equal number of male and female names in the contents as 
a whole. 
 The participants were tested in a group, and the experiment was presented in a 
booklet.  Its first page asked for some simple demographic information – the age and 
gender of the participant.  It then instructed the participants to imagine that they were 
finalists to enter the Portuguese secret service agency, and that their task was part of 
their admissions exam.  They would be presented with a true statement, which was part 
of a conversation, and they had to decide which situations were possible, and which 
situations were not possible, given the truth of the statement.  The second page showed 
an example of a problem.  The rest of the pages in the booklet were problems from the 
experiment proper.  Figure 1 shows a translation into English of a typical problem. 
 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
There were two versions of the printed booklet, which presented the problems in 
two different random orders.  Within each booklet, the order of the four conjunctions to 
be evaluated were in one random order for half the problems, and in another random 
order for the other half of the problems.  Each participant received a block with 24 
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problems in a different randomised order.  The participants were allowed to take as long 
as they liked to complete the experiment. 
 
Results and discussion 
 Nine of 44 participants responded that the situations in which both clauses of the 
disjunction were negative were possible for more than half the problems.  Such 
egregious errors suggest that they were not paying full attention, and so we dropped 
their data from the analyses.  The purely chance probability that a participant’s list of 
possibilities on a trial matches the theory’s prediction is 1/16, and in fact 15 of these 
possible patterns occurred in the experiment.  The only pattern that did not occur was 
one in which the only possibility for A or B was not-A and not-B.  It is therefore 
reasonable to assume a chance probability of 1/15 for a predicted pattern, any 
participant who matched the predictions on 5 or more trials is doing so in a statistically 
significant way (Binomial p < . 02), and all 35 participants had at least 5 such matches, 
with a mean of 12.5 matches on 24 trials (Sign test, p = .535, i.e., p < 1 in a billion). As 
in this test, we used nonparametric (“distribution free”) statistical tests throughout the 
present paper because they obviate problems of distribution, and because they allow us 
to test the reliability of predicted rank-order trends.  Unlike analysis of variance, which 
can test for linear trends, quadratic trends, and so forth, non-parametric tests can assess 
a monotonic increase from one condition to another.  Nonparametric tests are less 
powerful than parametric tests such as analysis of variance (see, e.g., Siegel & 
Castellan, 1988, Sec. 3.4.1), and so they are less likely to lead to an incorrect rejection 
of the null hypothesis (a Type I error). 
  Table 1 presents the predominant patterns of judgment for each of the four 
sorts of disjunction, where the predominant pattern for a participant is the one that 
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occurs most frequently over the six trials for a given sort of disjunction.  The numbers 
do not always sum to 35 because some participants did not have a predominant pattern 
for a particular sort of disjunction. 
 The table reveals two principal phenomena.  First, modulation occurred reliably, 
as shown by the frequencies in bold.  Given the a priori probability for the occurrence 
of a predicted pattern, each disjunction yielded a reliable percentage of the predicted 
patterns of evaluation.  Second, the degree to which individuals fit the predictions of 
modulation had a reliable concordance: as Table 1 shows, their fit with  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
the predictions had the following trend (with mean ranks in parentheses): exclusive 
disjunctions (3.7), forwards and backwards disjunctions (each 2.3) and inclusive 
disjunctions (1.6; Kendall’s W = .49,  χ2 df = 3, = 51.8, p <  1 in a million).  This trend 
reflects, on the one hand, the tendency for the participants to make an exclusive 
interpretation even in the case of the unmodulated disjunctions.  But, seven participants 
did make the inclusive interpretation, whereas no participant made this interpretation for 
exclusive disjunctions (Fisher-Yates exact test, p <  0.01, one tail).  As an anonymous 
reviewer pointed out, one factor that may have encouraged the exclusive interpretation 
of the unmodulated disjunctions was that, unlike the other disjunctions, it referred to 
two different individuals, e.g.: “Paula is running or Daniel is swimming”.  On the other 
hand, the trend also reflects the less clear-cut results for the forwards and backwards 
disjunctions.  One reason may be that, as we noted earlier, disjunctions, such as: 
 Andre is in Lisbon or he is in Portugal 
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seem pragmatically odd in the absence of context.  We suspect that participants were 
slightly confused by them, and so as a result they tended to revert to more typical 
interpretations or to idiosyncratic ones.  
 
Experiment 2 
The modulated interpretations of the four sorts of disjunctions corroborated in 
Experiment 1 should elicit different patterns of inference.  For example, an exclusive 
interpretation of A or B yields the mental models: 
 A 
  B 
and so if the disjunction is combined with the categorical premise, A, reasoners should 
infer: not B.  But, a forwards interpretation of A or B yields the mental models: 
 A B 
  B 
and so if the disjunction is combined with the categorical premise, A, reasoners should 
infer: B.   The experiment combined each of the four sorts of disjunction with each of 
the four sorts of categorical premise:  A, not-A, B, and not-B.  Table 2 below 
summarizes the model theory’s predictions for each of the 16 sorts of inference.  As the 
table shows, there are two cases in which a categorical premise is inconsistent with the 
predicted models of the disjunction.  In logic, any conclusion whatsoever follows from 
such a contradiction (Jeffrey, 1981).  But, in the context of multiple disjunctions, 
reasoners are likely to be biased towards a conclusion based on the core interpretation, 
not-A, which follows from both an inclusive and an exclusive disjunction. 
 
Method 
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Participants  
The participants were 88 students from ISPA who took part voluntarily. They were 70 
women and 18 men, average age 19 years (SD = 2.8). 
Design  
The participants acted as their own controls and chose one of three possible conclusions 
to inferences based on 3 different contents for each of the 16 sorts of inference (4 sorts 
of disjunction depending on modulation and four sorts of categorical premise: A, not-A, 
B, and not-B).  A typical trial, translated from the Portuguese was as follows, and both 
premises were presented in bold: 
 Someone, who tells the truth, asserts that: 
José ate seafood or he ate shrimp. 
In the mean time you know that: 
  José ate seafood. 
  What conclusion can you draw? 
a) José ate shrimp. 
b) José did not eat shrimp. 
c) José may or may not have eaten shrimp. 
In order to use all six contents from the previous experiment, but to avoid a task that 
was too long, we used the following assignment of contents to the sorts of inference.  
Half the participants had the following assignment:  
1. Contents 1-3 for inferences with categorical premises A and not-A and inclusive 
and forwards disjunctions, and contents 4-6 for inferences with categorical 
premises B and not-B and inclusive and forwards disjunctions.  
2. The converse assignments for inferences from exclusive and backwards 
disjunctions. 
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Half the participants had the opposite assignment of contents. 
Materials and Procedure 
We prepared two sorts of booklet containing one page of instructions, and each 
of the 48 problems on a separate page in a different random order for each booklet.  One 
sort of booklet had one assignment of contents to problems, and the other sort of 
booklet had the other assignment of contents to problems.  The key instruction was that 
the participants should choose one of the three possible responses (as shown above), 
depending on whether one or other conclusion followed of necessity or neither of them 
did.  We gave each participant one of the two sorts of booklet at random, with the 
constraint that the two sorts occurred equally often in the experiment as a whole.  The 
participants were allowed to take as much time as they needed to complete the booklets. 
 
Results and discussion 
The difference between the two assignments of contents had no reliable effect on the 
percentages of predicted responses (68% vs. 71% correct, Mann-Whitney test, z = 
1.055, p > .25, two-tailed), and so we amalgamated the results from the two groups for 
further analyses. Table 2 shows the percentages of predicted inferences from the four 
categorical premises combined with the four sorts of disjunction.  It is immediately 
apparent from the table that the contents of the inferences affected the inferences that 
the participants drew.  In other words, modulation influenced inferences.  Its predicted 
evaluation for any inference has a prior chance probability of 1/3.  Overall, the 
participants mean percentage of evaluations fitting the theory’s predictions was 64%, 
which was significantly better than chance (Wilcoxon test, z = 8.153, p < .0001; in fact, 
p is less than one in a million for z < 8.0).  Likewise, the participants fit the predictions 
better than chance for each of the four sorts of disjunction:   
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(Table 2 about here) 
 
Inclusive:    51% (Wilcoxon test, z = 6.616, p < .0001).  
Exclusive:   79% (Wilcoxon test, z = 8.139, p < .0001).  
Forwards:    61% (Wilcoxon test, z = 7.846, p < .0001).  
Backwards: 75% (Wilcoxon test, z = 7.987, p < .0001).  
Inferences from disjunctions are difficult, and a robust finding is that they are harder 
from negative categoricals than from affirmative categoricals (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 1991).  The stringent comparison is from exclusive disjunctions, because only 
in this case are both sorts of inference valid, and the difference, which is shown in Table 
2, was highly reliable (Wilcoxon test, z = 5.837, p < .0001).  However, it was also 
reliable for forwards inferences  (Wilcoxon test, z = 6.251, p < .0001) and for 
backwards inferences (Wilcoxon test, z = 4.962, p < .0001). 
For each of the 16 different sorts of inference, a participant evaluated three 
inferences for different contents.  If the response was the same for at least two of these 
inferences, then it was a predominant one.  We examined the predominant inferences 
for the different sorts of disjunction.  With inclusive disjunctions, the most frequent 
pattern of evaluations treated the disjunction as exclusive or was one evaluation away 
from it (24% of participants), but many participants understood that nothing follows 
from an affirmative categorical (19%), and many made this evaluation of all four 
categoricals (22%).  With exclusive disjunctions, most participants drew the predicted 
inferences or were only one inference away from them (72%).  With forwards 
disjunction, most participants made the predicted inferences or were only one inference 
away from them (42%), many inferred B from the categorical A but made no other 
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definite inferences (17%), and most of the remainder had no predominant response or 
made idiosyncratic evaluations (31%).  With backwards disjunctions, most participants 
made the predicted inferences or were only one inference away from them (67%), and 
there were no other frequent patterns.  In the case of forwards and backwards 
inferences, participants often relied on knowledge in inferences from negative 
categoricals, e.g.: from the premises:  
Sofia is in France or she is in Paris.   
Sofia is not in Paris. 
The participants tend to ignore the disjunction and to rely on the knowledge that a 
person who is not in Paris could be anywhere: 
 Sofia may or may not be in France. 
Disjunctive inferences are difficult, and the present participants had difficulty with 
them. Nevertheless, modulation exerted reliable effects on their performance. 
 
Experiment 3 
When participants are asked to choose among a set of options, as they were in 
the previous experiment, they may be inclined to guess their response.  Hence, our final 
experiment examined what conclusions participants drew for themselves from 
disjunctive premises combined with categoricals.   Disjunctions with no modulation 
tended to be interpreted as exclusive in the previous studies, and only a minority of 
participants interpreting them as inclusive.  We therefore dropped them from the present 
experiment, which accordingly examined only three sorts of disjunction: those for 
which modulation should yield exclusive, forwards, and backwards interpretations.  
These disjunctions were combined on separate trials with the four sorts of categorical 
premise: A, not-A, B, and not-B.  
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In order to examine the model theory’s predictions, we used the pattern of 
predicted conclusions shown in Table 2 above, and as a base line those predicted for the 
exclusive disjunction.  For each categorical premise, the model theory predicts a trend 
in the likelihood of the exclusive conclusion over the three sorts of disjunction.  For all 
four sorts of categorical, the exclusive disjunction should yield the most exclusive 
conclusions.  The categorical premise, Sofia is in Portugal, together with a backwards 
disjunction, such as: Sofia is in Portugal or she is in Porto, implies nothing about 
whether or not she is in Porto, and so participants should tend to respond that nothing 
follows or perhaps to make the exclusive response.  But, for a forwards disjunction, 
such as Andre is in Lisbon or he is in Portugal, the categorical premise, Andre is in 
Lisbon, should elicit the conclusion that Andre is in Portugal, which is the opposite to 
the exclusive conclusion. Hence, there should be the following trend for the categorical, 
A: exclusive disjunctions, A or B, should yield more exclusive responses than 
backwards disjunctions, which should yield more of them than forwards disjunctions.  
With the categorical not-A, exclusive disjunctions are most likely to receive exclusive 
conclusions, and the order of backwards and forwards should switch round, so the trend 
prediction should be: exclusive disjunctions yield more exclusive conclusions than 
forwards disjunctions, which should yield more of them than backwards disjunctions.  
With the categoricals, B and not-B, the orders of backwards and forwards disjunctions 
in the trends switch round from the previous predictions, but exclusive disjunctions 
always remain the most likely to elicit exclusive patterns of inference.  The summary of 
the trend predictions for the frequencies of exclusive interpretations is accordingly: 
Categorical premise, A:   Exclusive > Backwards > Forwards  
Categorical premise, not-A: Exclusive > Forwards   > Backwards 
Categorical premise, B: Exclusive > Forwards   > Backwards     
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Categorical premise, not-B: Exclusive > Backwards > Forwards 
The experiment tested these trend predictions in the participants’ spontaneous 
inferences from the disjunctions and the categorical premises.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty psychology students from ISPA’s laboratory pool, 71 male and 9 female, aged 
17 to 47 years (M = 22 years; SD = 6.7 years), participated in the experiment in 
exchange for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 
Design  
The participants acted as their own controls and carried out the three instances of each 
of the 12 sorts of inference based on three sorts of disjunction (exclusive, forwards, and 
backwards) and four sorts of categorical premise (A, not-A, B, and not-B), i.e., a total of 
36 trials.  We tested two separate groups of participants in to order to counterbalance 
the contents of the premises.  The order of the trials was random for each participant.  
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment used three sorts of contents from the sets in the previous experiments: 
locations, culture, and food.  We created two sets of these materials (see Supplemental 
Material C and D), and assigned each participant at random to one of them.  The 
participants carried out the experiment interacting with a computer in an individual 
cubicle, running an E-prime program that controlled the experiment. 
The instructions framed the task in terms of the test for spies used in the 
previous experiments.  It explained that the task was to write down what conclusion 
followed of necessity from the premises, that is, if the premises were true it must be true 
too.  The instructions also explained that the conclusion could be affirmative, or 
negative (giving hypothetical examples of each), and that the participants could also 
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respond “nothing follows” in case they thought that there was no conclusion that 
followed from the premises. 
There were two practice problems, which were simple inferences based on 
conditional premises – we designed them as a filter in order to exclude any participants 
who failed to draw their correct “modus ponens” conclusions.  The experiment proper 
followed them.  A typical trial appeared on the computer’s screen as follows: 
  Someone, who tells the truth, asserts that: 
Ana is in Portugal or she is in France. 
In fact, you know that: 
Ana is not in France. 
Please write down what conclusion follows of necessity from the premises. 
________________________________________ 
 
Results 
 Table 3 presents the percentages of the principal conclusions that the 
participants drew for themselves from the 12 sorts of premise.  It is based on the 
inferences drawn by 80 of the participants.  We excluded the data from 2 participants, 
because they failed to draw the two simple modus ponens conclusions in the practice 
problems.  Two independent judges evaluated the participants’ responses as affirming 
or denying the disjunct other than the categorical premise, allowing that it may or may 
not occur, drawing no conclusion, or falling into some other miscellaneous category.  
The judges were in close agreement (Cohen’s k = .96, p<.001).  The difference between 
the two sets of materials had no reliable effect on the percentages of predicted responses 
(62% vs. 56% correct, Mann-Whitney test, z = 1.750, p > .08, two-tailed), and so we 
amalgamated the results from the two groups for further analyses. 
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 As Table 3 shows, there is a highly salient difference between the uniformity of 
the conclusions to the exclusive disjunctions as opposed to the variety of conclusions to 
the forwards and backwards disjunctions.  To test the model theory, we examined its 
trend predictions in terms of the closeness to the pattern of inferences for exclusive 
disjunctions, which we outlined earlier.  Overall, the inferences that the participants 
drew corroborated the predicted rank orders, and the mean observed ranks were 1.41, 
1.84, 2.76 (Page’s L = 1068.0, z = 8.5, p < .0000003).  The percentages of exclusive 
responses and their mean rank orders over the participants for each of the 
categorical premises were as follows for the three sorts of disjunction:  
 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
Premise, A:   Exclusive (80% 1.59) > Backwards (44% 1.83) > Forwards    (32% 2.59) 
Premise, not-A: Exclusive (80%, 1.56) > Forwards   (54% 1.92)  > Backwards (40% 2.53) 
Premise, B: Exclusive (79% 1.62) > Forwards    (39% 1.78) > Backwards (32% 2.60) 
Premise, not-B: Exclusive (76% 1.58) > Backwards (51% 1.89) > Forwards   (35% 2.53) 
Page’s L for these trends ranged from 1036 to 1040, z ranged from 6.0 to 6.3, each with 
p < .0000003).  Overall, modulation had a highly reliable effect, and distinguished the 
three sorts of disjunction.  But, as in the previous study, forwards and backwards 
disjunctions tended to yield a greater variety of conclusions than exclusive disjunctions. 
 
General Discussion  
 The logician Bar-Hillel described the lack of application of logic to the analysis 
of everyday inferences as “ one of the greatest scandals of human existence” (Bar-
Hillel, 1969, p. 256).  Nearly fifty years later, there is still no algorithm for such 
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analyses.  One reason is that sentential connectives, such as disjunctions, have a 
constant meaning in formal logic, whereas in natural language they vary in their 
interpretation (e.g., Evans et al., 1993).  Several potential explanations for this variation 
exist, e.g., connectives could be ambiguous just as many words are, or their 
interpretation could be enthymemic, depending on other unstated premises that 
individuals call to mind.  However, according to the model theory, connectives are 
neither ambiguous nor enthymemic. They have a core meaning, but knowledge can 
modulate this meaning (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  Previous studies, as we 
discussed in the introduction, established the modulation of conditionals (Quelhas, et 
al., 2010; Juhos et al., 2012).  Our present studies corroborated its occurrence for 
disjunctions.  A disjunction such as: 
 Miguel is at the beach or Leonor is in the swimmi g pool. 
should not elicit any modulation, and so it should be interpretable in the core sense of 
disjunctions, which includes the possibility that both its clauses are true.  But, a 
disjunction such as: 
 Cristina is at the beach or she is at home. 
is modulated by the knowledge that one person cannot be in two different places at the 
same time.  It cannot receive an inclusive interpretation, but demands an exclusive 
interpretation in which one clause holds when the other does not.  It accordingly refers 
to two possibilities.  Modulation can in principle block the construction of any of the 
three possibilities to which the core interpretation refers.  A disjunction such as: 
 Sara is eating bass or she is eating fish. 
has a first clause that implies the second clause.  It should elicit a forwards 
interpretation in which there are two possibilities: Sara is eating bass and (therefore)  
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fish, and Sara is not eating bass but eating fish.  Hence, Sara is eating fish, which may 
or may not be bass.  When the order of the two clauses is reversed, as in the disjunction: 
 Sara is eating fish or she is eating bass 
the analogous backwards interpretation should also yield two possibilities in which Sara 
is eating fish, either bass or not. 
 When participants in Experiment 1 were asked to list what was possible given 
disjunctions of these four sorts (inclusive, exclusive, forwards, and backwards), they 
tended to list the possibilities that modulation predicts (see Table 1 above).  The 
interpretations were clear-cut for exclusive disjunctions: 97% of trials with this 
disjunction elicited the predicted interpretation.  Only a small proportion of trials (20%) 
yielded the inclusive interpretation for the unmodulated disjunction, but this 
interpretation never occurred for the exclusive disjunctions, and the difference was 
reliable.  Nothing prevents an exclusive interpretation for such disjunctions – a fact that 
has led to controversy about the basic meaning of disjunctions (cf. Fillenbaum, 1974; 
Newstead, Griggs, & Chrostowski, 1984; Chierchia et al., 2001; Noveck et al., 2002; 
Chevallier et al., 2008; and for a review, Johnson-Laird et al., 2012).  The forwards and 
backwards disjunctions were evidently a little confusing – they are perhaps 
pragmatically odd without an appropriate context, because they seem redundant (cf. 
Hurford, 1974). Yet, they led to 51% of forwards interpretations, and 49% of backwards 
interpretation (where chance is about 1/16), and their other interpretations were 
inclusive, exclusive, or idiosyncratic. 
Modulation also predicted the inferences that individuals drew from 
disjunctions. Experiment 2 combined disjunctions with a categorical premise in 
inferences of the sort: 
 A or B. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
s A
na
 C
ris
tin
a Q
ue
lha
s] 
at 
03
:10
 19
 Fe
bru
ary
 20
16
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
26 
 
 
 
 A. 
 What conclusion can you draw? 
a) B 
b) Not B. 
c) B may be or may not be. 
and A and B had the same contents as before. The results corroborated the effect of 
modulation.  For inclusive interpretations, the most frequent response with the 
categorical, A, was: B may or may not follow.  For exclusive interpretations, it was: Not 
B.  For forwards interpretations, it was: B.  And for backwards interpretations, it was: B 
may or may not follow.  In general, the results bore out the prediction that participants 
should draw inferences appropriate to modulated interpretations of disjunctions. They 
also replicated the previous findings that inferences from disjunctive premises are 
difficult (García-Madruga et al., 2001), and that inferences from disjunctions and 
negative categoricals are more difficult than those from disjunctions and affirmative 
categoricals (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993). 
 When participants drew their own conclusions for inferences from disjunctions 
paired with categorical premises, the task was just as difficult.  The model theory 
predicts trends over the different disjunctions in terms of the frequencies with which a 
conclusion should be the same as one from an exclusive disjunction.  For example, 
given a backwards disjunction, such as: José is eating seafood or he is eating shrimp, 
the categorical premise that José is not eating seafood implies that he is not eating 
shrimp, which is the opposite to the conclusion that follows from an exclusive 
disjunction, whereas for the forwards disjunction: José is eating shrimp or he is eating 
seafood, the categorical premise that he is not eating shrimp allows that he may or may 
not be eating seafood.  It follows that the inference corresponding to an exclusive 
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interpretation should show the following declining trend: exclusive disjunctions > 
backwards disjunctions > forwards disjunctions.  The model theory yields trends for 
each of the four sorts of categorical premise (A, not-A, B, not-B), and Experiment 3 
corroborated these trends.  Overall, the experimental results bore out the hypothesis that 
modulation has robust effects on the interpretation of disjunctions, which in turn yield 
predictable patterns of inference from them. 
 The effects of modulation in our studies concern the role of knowledge in 
blocking the construction of a model of a single possibility from the three possibilities 
to which a core disjunction, A or B, can refer to: 
  A ¬ B 
 ¬ A  B 
  A  B 
where “¬” denotes negation.  In principle, however, modulation can also prevent the 
construction of models of two possibilities, so that “or” refers to only a single 
possibility, as illustrated in these three cases, which show the single remaining 
possibility and examples of corresponding disjunctions: 
  A ¬ B  She’s married or I’m a Dutchman. 
 ¬ A    B  I’m a Dutchman or she’s married. 
  A  B  In my leisure, I paint pictures or I make up new recipes. 
The obvious falsity of the speaker being a Dutchman rules out two possibilities in the 
core interpretation.  What is of greater interest is the last example, in which or has the 
same meaning as and.  This meaning is common in disjunctions connecting phrases 
rather than clauses, such as: “I drink red or white wine,” which means that the speaker 
drinks both sorts of wine.  Why would disjunction have a conjunctive interpretation?   It 
signals that the two disjuncts do not hold at the same time.  In the last of the three 
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examples, the speaker both paints pictures and makes up recipes, but not at the same 
time.  And, in the phrasal example, the speaker likes both sorts of wine, but doesn’t 
drink them at the same time.  These three interpretations in which disjunctions refer to 
only a single possibility seem convincing enough not to merit empirical confirmation. 
 Are the phenomena of modulation open to an alternative explanation?  One 
recent development has been the rise of psychological theories based on probabilistic 
considerations (see, e.g., Evans, Handley, & Over, 2003; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005; 
Oaksford & Chater, 2007, and for a review, Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 
2015).  But, these theories have yet to address the problem of the different 
interpretations of sentential connectives.   
Another theoretical approach is that reasoning is based on formal rules of 
inference akin to those of a logical calculus, and that inferences are often enthymemes, 
i.e., they depend on knowledge in the form of additional premises (e.g., Rips, 1994; 
Braine & O’Brien, 1998; Stenning & Van Lambalgen, 2008).  Often, a major difficulty 
is to determine an appropriate missing premise.   The problem arises when modulation 
introduces a temporal relation in the interpretation of conditionals, which can affect the 
tense of the verbs in participants’ conclusions (Juhos et al., 2012).  But, it become acute 
in the case of disjunctive inferences, such as:  
 The fault is in the software or it is in the printer, or both. 
 Therefore, possibly the fault is in the software. 
Most people accept that the conclusion must be true given the premise (Hinterecker, 
Knauff, & Johnson-Laird, 2016).  It has the grammatical form: 
 A or B or both. 
 Therefore, possibly A. 
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The inference is not valid in any modal logic (Hughes & Cresswell, 1996), because A 
could be self-contradictory, and self-contradictions cannot be possible.  In the present 
example, the premise would be true if B is true, but the conclusion would be false, 
because self-contradictions are impossible.  The proof of the inference in logic therefore 
depends on an additional premise to rule out the case in which A is impossible.  So, an 
obvious candidate is the premise: 
 It is not the case that not possibly A. 
But, this double negative is equivalent to the conclusion to be drawn: 
 Possibly A.  
The argument is circular, and the original premise – the disjunction about the fault – has 
no role to play in the inference.   
Another approach, compatible with a probabilistic account and with formal rules 
of inference, is due to Grice (1989).  He emphasized that speakers communicate more  
 
than they say.  For instance, a remark such as: 
 Ana is in Portugal or she is in Spain 
conveys that the speaker does not know which of the two countries Ana is in.  
Otherwise, the speaker would have named a single country.  The inference that the 
speaker does not know Ana’s exact whereabouts is a “conversational implicature” that 
follows from the cooperative nature of conversation.  One sign of a conversational 
implicature is that it is deniable without creating a contradiction: 
 Ana is in Portugal or she is in Spain, but I am not allowed to tell you which. 
This remark implies that the speaker does know where she is.  Conversational 
implicatures have been implemented in many complex systems in formal semantics, 
game theory, and Bayesian probabilities.  They have also been used to explain the 
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conjunctive interpretation of disjunctions, such as: “He likes red or white wine (Franke, 
2011), and inferences from disjunctions to possibilities  (Sauerland, 2004), e.g.: 
 Ana is in Portugal or she is in Spain. 
 So, possibly she is in Portugal, and possibly she is in Spain. 
However, claim about a possibility, A, cannot be denied by asserting either that A holds, 
or does not hold, because its possibility is compatible with both these cases.  Its denial 
calls instead for an assertion that A is not possible, e.g.: 
 Ana is in Portugal or she is in Spain, and it is impossible that she is in Portugal,  
and it is impossible that she is in Spain. 
But, this assertion is self-contradictory.  It shows that the inference about Ana’s 
possible locations is not a conversational implicature, but a valid deduction.  Grice 
allowed for inferences that depend on the meanings of terms, which he called 
“conventional implicatures”.  And they can be denied only on pain of contradiction.  
Our computer program implementing modulation could be treated as an inference 
engine for Gricean conventional implicatures. 
Overall, modulation yields seven different interpretations of  “or”, including the 
three conjunctive senses above.   A corollary is the difficulty of the recovery of the 
logical form of assertions in everyday discourse – the form that matches that of the 
formal rules of inference.  We have already encountered a typical difficulty.  An 
assertion su h as: 
 At work, she talks to clients or she briefs programmers 
has the surface form of a disjunction.  But, it has the force of a conjunction: she talks to 
clients and she briefs programmers.  The disjunctions under investigation in the present 
studies all present analogous challenges to any algorithm designed to recover logical 
form.  Not surprisingly, no such algorithm exists.  In contrast, logical form plays a part 
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neither in the model theory nor in its computer implementation, which depends on the 
surface grammar of sentences (Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2013).  We do not claim 
that an enthymemic account is impossible.  But, it won’t be easy, and no-one has 
proposed such an account, let alone an algorithm implementing it, since the publication 
of modulation over a decade ago.  
 Any satisfactory account of disjunctions needs to deal with five principal 
phenomena.  Two of them concern unmodulated disjunctions: 
• Reasoning with disjunctions is harder than reasoning with conjunctions (e.g., García-
Madruga et al., 2001).   
• Deductions and inferences about consistency yield illusory inferences from 
unmodulated disjunctions (e.g., Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird et al., 
2012).  
The remaining three phenomena are reported in the present paper: 
• Modulation has an impact on the interpretations of disjunctions (see Table 1), and 
therefore on the inferences that individuals draw from them (see Tables 2 and 3). 
• The same valid deductions are easier to evaluate from exclusive disjunctions that 
modulation yields than from inclusive disjunctions (see Table 2).  
• Valid deductions from exclusive, forwards, and backwards disjunctions are easier with 
affirmative categorical premises than with negative categorical premises (see Table 2).  
The model theory predicts each of these phenomena (see our account in the 
Introduction).  Exclusive disjunctions have two mental models, whereas inclusive 
disjunctions have three mental models.  Affirmative categoricals allow an inference to 
be drawn from a single model of a disjunction whereas negative categories rule out a 
model and call for an examination of an alternative model.  As far as we can tell no 
other theory presently accounts for all five of the phenomena. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
s A
na
 C
ris
tin
a Q
ue
lha
s] 
at 
03
:10
 19
 Fe
bru
ary
 20
16
 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
32 
 
 
 
 In conclusion, differences in the interpretation of the disjunctive sentential 
connective, or, arise from the influence of the contents of clauses and of knowledge. 
The connective has a core meaning, which allows for an inclusive interpretation.  But, 
modulation affects this interpretation, and it can do so by blocking the construction of 
models of various possibilities.  In theory, it can block any single possibility, and any 
pair of possibilities, from the three models of possibilities that the core meaning allows.  
Our studies have shown that modulation yields three different interpretations: exclusive, 
forwards, and backwards disjunctions.  These modulations, in turn, led to differences in 
the inferences that disjunctions yield.  Reasoning with disjunctions is difficult – if only 
because it usually calls for reasoners to take into account more than one model of a 
possibility, and multiple models transcend intuition and place considerable demands on 
deliberation.  The inferences that individuals judge to be valid and that they draw for 
themselves depend on the possibilities to which the premises refer.  As modulation 
changes these possibilities from one sort of interpretation of a disjunction to another, so, 
too, do the inferences that individuals make.  
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Supplemental Material 
 
Supplemental Material A - Materials for Experiment 1 and 2 in English. 
Supplemental Material B – Materials for Experiments 1 and 2 in the original 
Portuguese. 
Supplemental Material C – Materials for Experiment 3 in English. 
Supplemental Material D – Materials for Experiment 3 in original Portuguese. 
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Figure 1.  A typical problem from Experiment 1. 
 
 
Henrique is in Lisbon or he is in Rome. 
Given that this assertion is true, your task is to decide whether each of the following 
situations is possible or impossible: 
Henrique is in Lisbon and he is in Rome. Possible □  Impossible □ 
Henrique is in Lisbon and he is not in Rome. Possible □  Impossible □ 
Henrique is not in Lisbon and he is in Rome. Possible □  Impossible □ 
Henrique is not in Lisbon and he is not in Rome. Possible □  Impossible □ 
 
Note: The number of “possible” and “impossible” responses need not be equal. 
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Table 1: The frequencies of predominant patterns of judgments for the four sorts of 
disjunction in Experiment 1 (n = 35).  A predominant pattern is one that occurs most 
frequently in a participant’s six trials with a given sort of disjunction, and so any total 
less than 35 occurred because some participants had no single predominant pattern in 
their judgments. Miscellaneous evaluations are patterns of responses that no more than 
three participants made in the experiment as a whole. The symbol “¬” denotes a 
negative clause, and the frequencies in bold are those for the evaluations that the model 
theory predicts. 
 
 The predominant patterns of evaluation 
Sort of 
disjunction 
   A ¬ B 
¬ A    B 
  A    B 
  A ¬B 
¬ A  B 
 
 
¬A  B 
  A  B 
A ¬B 
 
A   B 
Miscellaneous TOTAL 
Inclusive 7 24   4 35 
Exclusive  34   0 34 
 Forwards 2 3 18  7 30 
 Backwards 2 4  17 6 29 
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Table 2: The predicted responses and their percentages in Experiment 2 for each of the 
16 sorts of inference. The symbol “?” denotes the response option that the categorical 
conclusion may, or may not, follow, and the symbol “¬” denotes negation. In two cases, 
as the asterisk shows, the categorical premise is inconsistent with the predicted 
interpretation of the disjunction.  
  The sort of categorical premise 
Sort of 
disjunction 
Possibilities to 
which the 
disjunction 
should refer 
A Not-A B Not-B 
Inclusive 
   A    ¬ B 
¬ A       B 
   A       B 
? 
54 
B 
50 
? 
50 
A 
49 
 
Exclusive 
   A    ¬ B 
¬ A       B 
Not-B 
96 
B 
66 
Not-A 
 92 
A: 
62 
 
Forwards 
   A       B 
¬ A       B 
B 
74 
B 
34 
? 
73 
not-A*  
64 
Backwards 
   A        B 
   A     ¬ B 
? 
81 
Not-B* 
70 
A 
71 
A 
39 
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Table 3: The percentages of the participants’ principal spontaneous conclusions for each 
of the twelve sorts of inference in Experiment 3, where “?” designates “nothing 
follows”, and “*” indicates that the categorical premise is inconsistent with the 
predicted interpretation of the disjunction.  
   The sort of categorical premise 
Sort of 
disjunction 
Possibilities 
to which 
the 
disjunction 
should 
refer 
A Not-A B Not-B 
 
Exclusive 
  A    ¬ B 
¬ A       B 
∴not-B 
 80 
∴ B 
 80 
∴ not-A 
  79 
∴ A 
   76 
 
Forwards 
  A       B 
¬ A       B 
∴ B ∴not-B ? 
  45    32    10 
∴ B ∴not-B ? 
 54     12    31 
∴ A  ∴ not-A  ? 
    9     39       35 
∴ A* ∴not-A   ?  
 35     29        25 
Backwards 
  A        B 
  A     ¬ B 
∴B  ∴ not-B  ? 
   5     44    32 
∴B* ∴not-B ? 
 40     29     23 
∴ A  ∴not-A  ? 
 44     32       10 
∴A  ∴ not-A   ? 
51      12       32 
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